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i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the criminal prohibitions in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B(a)(1) on provision of “training,” “expert advice
or assistance” “derived from … other specialized
knowledge,” and “service” to organizations designated
as terrorist are unconstitutionally vague as applied to
speech that furthers only lawful, nonviolent activities
of the proscribed organizations.

ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
The following parties were plaintiffs in the
district court and appellees and cross-appellants in the
court of appeals, and are respondents in this Court:
Humanitarian Law Project; Ralph Fertig; Ilankai
Thamil Sangam; Tamils of Northern California; Tamil
Welfare and Human Rights Committee; Federation of
Tamil Sangams of North America; World Tamil
Coordinating Committee; and Nagalingam Jeyalingam.

The following parties were defendants in the
district court and appellants and cross-appellees in the
court of appeals, and are petitioners in this Court: the
Attorney General of the United States, Eric Holder, Jr.;
the United States Department of Justice; the United
States Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton; and
the United States Department of State.
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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a32a) is reported at 552 F.3d 916. Earlier opinions of
the court of appeals are reported at 393 F.3d 902, 352
F.3d 382, and 205 F.3d 1130. The opinion of the
district court (Pet. App. 33a-76a) is reported at 380 F.
Supp. 2d 1134. Earlier opinions of the district court
are reported at 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 9 F. Supp. 2d
1176, and 9 F. Supp. 2d 1205.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The First Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in pertinent part: “Congress
shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble.”
The Fifth Amendment provides, in
pertinent part: “No person shall … be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The
relevant statutory provisions are reprinted at Pet. App.
77a-81a.
STATEMENT
The injunction at issue in this case narrowly
bars the application of three provisions of 18 U.S.C. §
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2339B, a criminal proscription carrying a penalty of 15
years’ imprisonment or life imprisonment if death
results, to respondents’ proposed speech in support of
the lawful, nonviolent activities of two foreign
organizations designated as “terrorist.” The court of
appeals left the entire statute valid on its face, and
merely held that the prohibitions on providing
“training,” “expert advice or assistance” “derived from
… other specialized knowledge,” and “service” were
unconstitutionally vague as applied to respondents’
proposed speech. Respondents seek, among other
things, to teach persons in conflict situations how to
use international law and other nonviolent means to
advance human rights. As applied to such pure speech,
the court held, the three particular provisions are
insufficiently clear about what they criminalize.
The district court rejected all of respondents’
challenges except to the application of the three
provisions noted, and therefore left intact the entire
material-support statute on its face. The court declined
to issue a nationwide injunction. Pet. App. 76a. Even
as applied to respondents, the court’s decision expressly
permits enforcement of the remainder of the statute,
which prohibits provision of, inter alia, “any property,
tangible or intangible, … including currency or
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial
services, lodging, … safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities,
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel …
and transportation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (definitional
provision incorporated into § 2339B); see Pet. App. 76a
n.29.
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The court of appeals unanimously affirmed the
district court in all respects, upholding the limited
injunction and rejecting the remainder of respondents’
claims. The court of appeals denied the government’s
petition for rehearing en banc, again without dissent.
A. The Statutory Scheme
Sections 302 and 303 of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1189 and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, respectively,
authorize the Secretary of State to designate “foreign
terrorist organizations” and make it a crime to provide
certain “material support” for even nonviolent and
humanitarian activities of such groups.
Section 1189 of 8 U.S.C. authorizes the Secretary to
designate as “terrorist” any group: (1) that is foreign;
(2) that has ever used or threatened to use a weapon
against person or property; and (3) whose activities
threaten the “national defense, foreign relations, or
economic interests of the United States.”1 Once the
Secretary designates a group, it becomes a crime to
“knowingly provide[] material support or resources” to
it, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a), with the phrase “material
support or resources” defined as “mean[ing]” certain
activities listed in a definition of the same phrase in a
related statute.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4),
incorporating definitions of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b).
Unlike other federal statutes criminalizing support for
“terrorist activity,” see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a), the
1

8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (criteria for designation); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B) (definition of “engage in terrorist activity”); 8
U.S.C. §1189(d)(2) (definition of “national security”).
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prohibition at issue here, § 2339B(a)(1), does not
require any showing that the defendant intended that
his support be used for any terrorist, violent, or
independently illicit purpose. “Knowing[]” provision of
“material support or resources” to a designated group is
enough.
In enacting the material-support statute in 1996,
Congress declared that any “contribution to” a foreign
organization that engages in terrorist activity
“facilitates that conduct.” AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104132, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (April 24, 1996),
18 U.S.C. § 2339B note (emphasis added). Then, in
defining its proscriptions, Congress listed a number of
activities, using terms of varying clarity and breadth,
while expressly permitting unlimited donations of
medicine and religious materials. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A(b)(1). In the Ninth Circuit, the government
argued that Congress was trying not to impinge on
actual speech:
The law was carefully drafted … to ensure that it
does not infringe upon constitutional rights.
Recognizing that “[t]he First Amendment protects
one’s right to associate with groups that are
involved in both legal and illegal activities,”
Congress noted that the statutory ban “only
affects one’s contribution of financial or material
resources” to a foreign terrorist organization, a
ban that is permissible because “[t]he First
Amendment’s protection of the right of association
does not carry with it the ‘right’ to finance
terrorist, criminal activities.” But “[t]he basic
protection of free association afforded individuals
under the First Amendment remains in place”
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in place” even under the statutory prohibition,
because it does not prohibit “one’s right to think,
speak, or opine in concert with, or on behalf of,
such an organization.”
C.A. First Cross-Appeal Br. for Appellants at 5-6 (Apr.
4, 2006) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-383, at 43, 44
(1995)). And in 2004 Congress added to the statute an
express recognition that application of the statute
might infringe First Amendment interests, and
disclaimed any intent to abridge such rights in the
statute’s construction or application:
(i)

Rule of construction.—Nothing in this
section shall be construed or applied so as
to abridge the exercise of rights guaranteed
under the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.

18 U.S.C. § 2339B(i) (emphasis added).
Partly in response to several decisions in this
litigation, Congress amended the statute in the USA
Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 805(a)(2), 115
Stat. 272, 377 (2001), and again in the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA),
Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6603(b), 118 Stat. 3638, 3762
(2004). The current version of the statute prohibits
provision of “training,” which the statute since 2004
has defined as “instruction or teaching designed to
impart a specific skill, as opposed to general
knowledge.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2). The statute also
outlaws the provision of “expert advice or assistance,”
which since 2004 has been defined as “advice or
assistance derived from scientific, technical or other
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specialized knowledge.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3). And,
in a provision added in 2004, the statute prohibits the
provision of “service,” without defining that term. The
government maintains that “service” includes any “act
done for the benefit of” a designated group. Pet. 17.
The statute contains many other enumerated
prohibitions that are not now at issue – quoted supra.2
B. Respondents’ Intended Support
Respondents include the Humanitarian Law
Project (HLP), a longstanding human rights
organization with consultative status to the United
Nations; Ralph Fertig, a retired United States
administrative law judge who has served as the HLP’s
President; Nagalingam Jeyalingam, an American
physician; and several domestic organizations of
persons of Tamil descent. Prior to AEDPA’s enactment,
the HLP and Judge Fertig had been assisting the
2

One provision – which the court of appeals and district court
upheld and so is not at issue in the petition (but is addressed in
respondents’ limited conditional cross-petition) – is the prohibition
on providing “personnel.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b). Since 2004, the
amended statute has provided:
No person may be prosecuted under this section in
connection with the term “personnel” unless that person has
knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to
provide a foreign terrorist organization with 1 or more
individuals (who may be or include himself) to work under
that terrorist organization’s direction or control or to
organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the
operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely
independently of the foreign terrorist organization to
advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be
working under the foreign terrorist organization’s direction
and control.
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h).
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Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) in human rights
advocacy and peacemaking efforts. They seek to
continue supporting the PKK in such activities. Dr.
Jeyalingam and the Tamil organizations similarly seek
to engage in speech in support of the humanitarian and
political activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE).3
In the mid-1990s, the Secretary of State designated
both the PKK and LTTE as terrorist organizations. In
this case, resolved on summary judgment, the district
court made no findings about terrorist activities of
either group, but did find that both groups engage in a
broad range of lawful activities, including the provision
of social services, political advocacy, and economic
development. Pet. App. 34a-36a. The PKK is the
principal political organization representing the Kurds
in Turkey, an ethnic minority subjected to substantial
discrimination and human rights violations. See id. at
34a-35a. Similarly, the LTTE is the principal political
organization representing the Tamils in Sri Lanka,
another ethnic minority that has been subjected to
human rights abuses and discrimination. See id. at
35a. It is undisputed that respondents intend to
support only the lawful and nonviolent activities of
these groups. Id. at 34a-36a (describing intended
support).
3

As the petition notes, the LTTE were recently defeated militarily
in Sri Lanka. Pet. 5 n.1. Much of the support the Tamil
organizations and Dr. Jeyalingam sought to provide is now moot,
because it consisted of humanitarian assistance to persons living
in LTTE-controlled areas of Sri Lanka. However, the LTTE
continues to exist as a political organization outside Sri Lanka
advocating for the rights of Tamils, and respondents continue to
seek to support its lawful, nonviolent activities through the speech
identified by the court of appeals, Pet. App. 5a n.1.
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C. The Decisions Below
Respondents initially filed this action in 1998, after
the Secretary of State designated the PKK and the
LTTE as foreign terrorist organizations.
They
challenged the statute on First and Fifth Amendment
grounds, and asserted, among other things, that the
statute’s prohibitions on providing “training” and
“personnel” were unconstitutionally vague. (Neither
provision was defined in the original 1996 statute).
The district court granted respondents a preliminary
and permanent injunction against enforcement of these
two provisions, finding them unconstitutionally vague.
See Pet. App. 6a-7a. It rejected respondents’ other
challenges, including their contention that the statute
infringed on the right of association. Id. Two separate
panels of the court of appeals, in 2000 and 2003,
unanimously affirmed both the preliminary and
permanent injunctions. Id. at 7a, 8a.
Meanwhile, when Congress in 2001 amended the
“material support” statute to add a prohibition on the
provision of “expert advice or assistance,” respondents
filed a second challenge. The district court in March
2004 held that this provision, too, was
unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 8a.
In September 2004, in the original case, the court
of appeals granted rehearing en banc (on requests from
both parties). Id. at 9a. While en banc review was
pending, Congress in 2004 amended the statute,
providing definitions for “training,” “personnel,” and
“expert advice or assistance,” and adding a new, and
undefined, prohibition on the provision of “service.” Id.
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at 9a-10a. In response, the en banc court of appeals
remanded for consideration of the effect of these
statutory amendments. Id. at 11a.
On remand, the district court held that Congress’s
definition of “personnel” cured the vagueness of that
provision, but that the prohibitions on “training” and
on “expert advice or assistance” “derived from … other
specialized knowledge” were still unconstitutionally
vague as applied to respondents’ intended speech. Id.
at 62a-66a, 68a-69a. It also held that the new, and
undefined, ban on the provision of “service” was vague
as applied to respondents’ speech. Id. at 66a-68a. It
rejected respondents’ other contentions. Id. at 46a-60a,
69a-74a.
Both parties appealed, and the court of appeals
once again unanimously affirmed. It reasoned that the
constitutional “‘requirement for clarity is enhanced’”
where, as here, a criminal statute touches on “‘sensitive
areas of basic First Amendment freedoms.’” Id. at 20a
(quoting Info. Providers’ Coal. for the Def. of the First
Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 874 (9th Cir. 1991)).
It stressed that it was addressing only the provisions’
vagueness as applied to respondents’ conduct, id. at 2a,
22a n.6, and noted that those activities all constituted
speech. Id. at 5a n.1 (describing respondents’ proposed
activities as “to train members … on how to use
humanitarian and international law to peacefully
resolve disputes”; “to engage in political advocacy”; “to
teach … members how to petition various
representative bodies such as the United Nations for
relief”; “to train members to present claims for
tsunami-related aid to mediators and international
bodies”; “to offer their legal expertise in negotiating
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in negotiating peace agreements”; “to engage in
political advocacy”).4
With respect to “training,” the court found it
“highly unlikely that a person of ordinary intelligence
would know whether, when teaching someone to
petition international bodies for tsunami related aid,
one is imparting a ‘specific skill’ or ‘general
knowledge.’” Id. at 21a-22a. Stressing that the term
as defined “could still be read to encompass speech and
advocacy protected by the First Amendment,” id. at
22a, the court held that
the term “training” remains impermissibly vague
because it “implicates, and potentially chills,
Plaintiffs’ protected expressive activities and
imposes criminal sanctions of up to fifteen years
imprisonment without sufficiently defining the
prohibited conduct for ordinary people to
understand.”
Id. at 22a-23a (quoting id. at 64a).
The court noted that the prohibition on “expert
advice or assistance” similarly encompassed protected
speech, and concluded that it was unconstitutionally
vague in part. Id. at 24a. Specifically, it held that the
prohibition on advice or assistance “derived from …
other specialized knowledge” did not give “a person of
ordinary intelligence reasonable notice of conduct
4

Respondents initially sought to provide a broader range of
humanitarian assistance to the PKK and the LTTE, but the
injunction affirmed by the court of appeals is limited to the speech
activities described by the district court and the court of appeals.
Pet. App. 5a n.1; id. at 35a-36a.
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prohibited under the statute.” Id. at 23a; see also id. at
23a-24a. But the court upheld the prohibition on
advice or assistance “derived from scientific [or]
technical … knowledge.” Id. at 24a.
The court also held vague as applied the
prohibition on “service,” which encompassed the bans
on “training” and “expert advice or assistance” that it
had already held vague. Id. at 25a (adopting district
court’s holding and reasoning at id. at 66a-68a).
The court agreed with the district court that the
amended definition of “personnel” cured that term’s
prior vagueness. Id. at 26a-27a. And it rejected
respondents’ other contentions, including the
contention that the statute imposed guilt by
association in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s
requirement that statutes impose only individual
culpability. Id. at 13a-19a; id. at 27a-32a.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
The petition should be denied. The decision
below is a straightforward application of settled
vagueness doctrine, resulting in a narrow decision
carefully confined to three sub-provisions of the
material-support statute as they apply to respondents’
proposed speech activities. The government has
identified no decision from any court, much less this
Court or a court of appeals, that is in conflict with the
decision below. The decision itself applies to a unique
context involving pure speech that Congress in all
likelihood did not intend to criminalize, and that in any
event is peripheral to the statute’s purpose. The
decision leaves the material-support statute valid on
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its face, and declares only a small portion of it vague as
applied to respondents’ intended speech in support of
indisputably lawful and nonviolent ends. Thus, the
government may continue, and has continued, to
enforce the material-support statute, including the
provisions enjoined as applied here.
Moreover, because the decision below rests on
vagueness, Congress remains free to define more
precisely the conduct it seeks to prohibit, should it
conclude that it is critical to ban “training,” “expert
advice or assistance,” and “service” as applied to speech
in support of otherwise lawful activities. The court’s
decision does not rule these activities immune from
regulation, but merely demands greater precision.
The government’s protestations about national
security aside, it has made no showing that the limited
injunction at issue here undermines its efforts to fight
terrorism in any meaningful way. Nor has it cited a
single prosecution that was or would have been
frustrated by the court of appeals’ narrow, as-applied
ruling.
I. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Does Not
Warrant Review Because Its Narrow, AsApplied Ruling Leaves the Material-Support
Statute Facially Intact and Permits
Congress to Take Further Action
The government identifies no conflict in the
circuits, but contends that review is nonetheless
warranted on the ground that the decision below
invalidates part of an Act of Congress, and because
“the material-support statute is an important tool in
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the Nation’s fight against international terrorism.”
Pet. 10-11. But the decision below leaves the entirety
of the material-support statute facially intact, and
enjoins only three specific sub-provisions as applied to
respondents’ pure speech in support of lawful,
nonviolent ends. In any event, this Court does not
automatically review decisions invalidating federal
statutes.
The government does not and could not assert
that a case in which an Act of Congress is invalidated
always merits review. Pet. 9. Congress itself rejected
that conclusion in 1988, when, with the support of all
nine Justices, it eliminated 28 U.S.C. § 1252’s
provision for non-discretionary appellate jurisdiction in
cases declaring federal statutes unconstitutional. See
United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 59 & n.5
(1989); H.R. Rep. No. 100-660, at 2, 9 (1988), reprinted
in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 766, 767, 774.
Earlier this year, the Court denied a government
petition seeking review of a ruling that invalidated an
Act of Congress on First Amendment (including
vagueness) grounds. Mukasey v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 129 S. Ct. 1032 (2009) (denying United
States petition, No. 08-565, seeking review of American
Civil Liberties Union v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir.
2008)). Even before the amendment of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1252, the Court denied review where, as here, a lower
court had merely held that a federal statute could not
be applied constitutionally to a particular set of facts.
Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985) (declaring
that Title VII provisions prohibiting race and sex
discrimination were unconstitutional as applied to
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church’s decision to hire a pastor), cert. denied, 478
U.S. 1020 (1986).
Review in this case should similarly be denied.
The decision below is carefully circumscribed, holding
only that three particular sub-provisions of a statute
are invalid as applied to the pure speech in which
respondents want to engage. The court of appeals did
not invalidate any aspect of the statute on its face and,
in fact, specifically disclaimed any such ruling. Pet.
App. 2a-3a, 22a n.6, 27a-29a. The court also expressly
noted that its ruling did not extend to a situation
where any money passed to the designated
organizations. Id. at 3a, 25a n.8. The limited activities
that the court of appeals identified as protected by the
narrow injunction it upheld are all pure speech. Id. at
5a n.1 (“to train members … on how to use
humanitarian and international law to peacefully
resolve disputes”; “to engage in political advocacy”; “to
teach … members how to petition various
representative bodies such as the United Nations for
relief”; “to train members to present claims for
tsunami-related aid to mediators and international
bodies”; “to offer their legal expertise in negotiating
peace agreements”; “to engage in political advocacy”).
The court of appeals’ ruling leaves the entire
statute valid on its face. The government is free to
enforce the statute – including the “training,” “expert
advice or assistance,” and “service” clauses -- in other
contexts, and, by its own account, it has done so
successfully. Pet. 11. The only direct restriction the
decision imposes is on enforcement of three specific
provisions against these respondents for the speech
identified above. The government cites not a single
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instance of similar speech in furtherance of lawful,
nonviolent activities that it has been frustrated from
prosecuting.5
The decision does not warrant review for a
related reason. The court of appeals held only that the
particular provisions at issue were written too vaguely.
That ruling does not foreclose further congressional
action; Congress need only be more precise in targeting
forms of support that it concludes warrant criminal
prohibition, thereby avoiding needless collateral harm
to First Amendment protected speech and association.
Such a process of further congressional consideration
and refinement is particularly appropriate given that
Congress, as it expressly declared in 2004 and the
government stressed to the court of appeals, was
acutely aware of the sensitive First Amendment
terrain and positively trying to avoid harm to protected
speech. See page 4, supra.

The government cites only two cases in which it has charged
defendants with providing “training,” “expert advice or
assistance,” or “service.” Pet. 11. In both it confronted no
obstacles to proceeding. Neither involved speech in furtherance
solely of lawful, nonviolent ends. In United States v. Shah, No. 05Cr-673 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 6, 2006), defendants were
alleged to have provided “martial arts training and instruction” to
al Qaeda and “medical support to wounded jihadists.” Pet. 11. In
United States v. Iqbal, No. 06-Cr-1054 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan.
20, 2007), defendant was alleged to have sold satellite
transmission services to Hizballah, which the indictment
characterized as, inter alia, “property, tangible and intangible,”
and “facilities,“ provisions not at issue here. Superseding
Indictment at 3. Both cases resulted in convictions. The
government has cited no case in which it has sought to prosecute
individuals for pure speech in furtherance of lawful activities but
was, or would have been, barred from doing so by this decision.
5
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In this respect, the constitutional ruling by the
court of appeals is not the end of the matter for
Congress. It bears important similarities to statutory
rulings, to which Congress may respond through
ordinary legislation. Such rulings generally do not
warrant this Court’s review without a persistent circuit
conflict. Indeed, when earlier versions of this very
statute were held invalid, the Executive returned to
Congress and obtained statutory clarifications. While
the court below held that some of those clarifications
were not adequate, Congress can readily undertake
further revisions, with the added guidance the court
below has provided.
Moreover, the government’s own argument that
there are “numerous legitimate applications” of the ban
on training – for example, “training a terrorist
organization on how to build a bomb, use a weapon, fly
a plane, or launder money” (Pet. 21) – shows how easy
it is to write more precisely to target specific activities
of concern, without criminalizing constitutionally
protected speech. Nothing in the court of appeals’
opinion precludes Congress from criminalizing the
provision of instruction in techniques that terrorist
organizations have used to carry out violent attacks.
Finally, the government cites no conflict in the
circuits, notwithstanding that the statute has been on
the books for more than a decade, and in its current
amended form for five years. In the absence of any
disagreement in the circuits, any evidence that the
decision has undermined the government’s antiterrorism efforts, or any reason to believe the court’s
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narrow as-applied holding will have wider effects, the
case does not merit review.6
II. The Decision Below Correctly Applies
Settled Doctrine
The court of appeals correctly applied clearly
established principles of constitutional law.
Its
conclusions that the statute’s prohibitions on the
provision of “training,” “expert advice or assistance” in
the form of information “derived from … specialized
knowledge,” and “service” are unconstitutionally vague
as applied to respondents’ proposed speech are firmly
grounded and raise neither new nor significant
questions of law.
A. The Provisions Are Vague As Applied to
Respondents’ Intended Speech
1. Training
The court of appeals correctly held that the
prohibition on “training” requires individuals to draw
impossible distinctions between prohibited instruction
in a “specific skill” and permissible instruction in
“general knowledge.” Pet. App. 20a-23a. Respondents
are forced to guess at whether human rights advocacy
6

The court of appeals rejected respondents’ contention that the
bans on providing “personnel” and “expert advice or assistance”
”derived from scientific [or] technical … knowledge” were similarly
unconstitutional.
Respondents do not independently seek
certiorari on those aspects of the court’s ruling. But they are filing
a conditional cross-petition for certiorari, because these provisions
are sufficiently related to the three provisions at issue in the
government’s petition to warrant review as well, if the Court
grants review at all.
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or peacemaking, for example, are “specific skills” or
“general knowledge.” And what about training in
public speaking, lobbying Congress, or public relations?
The statute provides no guidance.
The attempts by government counsel below to
clarify the distinction only confirmed how murky it is.
Counsel opined that, under this definition, teaching
geography would be permissible because it constitutes
“general knowledge,” but teaching the political
geography of terrorist organizations would constitute a
banned “specific skill,” as would the teaching of
English.7 What if a “general” course on geography
included a discussion of the political geography of
terrorist organizations? What if it included a session
on the history of geography, or the geography of a
specific region incorporating statistical information?
An ordinary person could only hazard a guess as to
whether these are impermissible “specific skills,” or
permissible aspects of “general knowledge.”
In the district court, government counsel
asserted that respondents were free to advocate “on
behalf of” the PKK before the United Nations or “any
forum of their choosing.” Govt. Mem. in Supp. of S.J.
at 17 n.8. But when the district court asked whether
respondents could lobby the UN with members of the
PKK present, and then divide up into groups to lobby
the rest of the UN, counsel first opined that such
conduct “presumably could” constitute “training,” D.

The colloquy took place during the en banc oral argument, at
approximately 49 minutes into the argument. At the time of oral
argument, Congress had passed IRTPA, but President Bush had
not yet signed it into law.
7
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Ct. Tr. 11, SER 220,8 and minutes later opined that it
“clearly comes within the proscriptions against training
and expert advice or assistance.” Id. at 15; SER 224.
At the close of the colloquy, the district court said, “I
don’t know how you think anyone, a normal person,
would figure this out based on this exchange.” Id. at
19, SER 228.
The court of appeals correctly
determined that this provision is unconstitutionally
vague as applied to respondents’ proposed speech.
2. Expert Advice or Assistance
The court also correctly concluded that the ban
on providing “expert advice or assistance” “derived
from … specialized knowledge” is unconstitutionally
vague. Much as with “training,” a citizen must guess
as to whether any aspect of his advice is somehow
derived from “other specialized knowledge.” An expert
on human rights could presumably provide advice only
if it was derived from “general knowledge,” but not if
any particular answer was informed by “specialized
knowledge.” But how does one distinguish which
aspects of human rights derive from general as opposed
to specialized knowledge? Indeed, if general knowledge
is “specialized knowledge” that has become sufficiently
widely known, then literally all general knowledge may
be said to be “derived from” specialized knowledge.9
8 “SER”

refers to the Supplemental Excerpts of Record in the court
of appeals.
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knowledge.9 The lower court correctly determined that
this provision, too, is vague as applied here.
3. Service
The most expansive provision in the definition of
“material support” is the prohibition on providing any
“service” to a designated group, which Congress added
in 2004 without defining the term. That term was
likewise correctly held unconstitutionally vague.
Attempting to show otherwise, the government,
citing a dictionary, maintains that the term
encompasses any “act done for the benefit ... of
another.” Pet. 17. But that interpretation only makes
matters more confusing, as it appears to conflict with
the narrowing limitations Congress simultaneously
placed in the statute’s other definitions. Thus, while
Congress provided that teaching a subject of “general
knowledge” would not constitute prohibited “training,”
it could be considered an “act done for the benefit of” a
designated group. Similarly, advice derived from nonspecialized knowledge is exempted from the “expert
advice” definition, but could be prohibited by the
9

The government notes that the definition tracks Federal Rule of
Evidence 702. Pet. 15. As the district court held, however, Rule
702, a general guide for trained judges and lawyers, “does not
clarify the term ... for the average person with no background in
the law.” Pet. App. 66a. It is one thing to use the standard as a
guide to judges overseeing civil litigation; it is another to hold
citizens criminally liable under such terms. Here, as elsewhere in
the law, “context matters.” Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006) (quoting
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003)); see Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2754 (2007); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005).
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government’s gloss on “service.” The “personnel”
definition added in 2004 likewise seeks to protect acts
done “entirely independently of the … organization to
advance its goals or objectives,” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h),
yet such activity would be a crime if seen as “for the
benefit of” the organization. And, as noted above,
Congress in 2004 (the same time that it added the
“service” prohibition) specifically disclaimed that its
statute should be construed or applied to outlaw
protected speech (id. § 2339B(i)) – such as, e.g., a
domestic speech stressing the humanitarian work of a
designated organization to improve its reputation,
which could certainly be seen as “for the benefit of” the
organization.
The government’s construction of
“service” renders the statute hopelessly vague.
At the same time, the government claims that
the statute does not reach advocacy “on behalf of” a
designated group. Govt. Mem. in Supp. of S.J. at 17
n.8. But if that is so, respondents must somehow
distinguish between permissibly advocating “on behalf
of” and impermissibly advocating “for the benefit of” a
designated group. How is an ordinary person supposed
to know whether his advocacy of the PKK’s position on
Kurdish human rights is permissible advocacy “on
behalf of” the group, or a proscribed service “for the
benefit of” the group?
As construed by the government, the “service”
provision also forces individuals to guess whether their
affiliation with a group may constitute a prohibited
“service.” Before the “service” prohibition was added in
2004, the government represented that citizens were
free under this statute to join designated groups, and
that concession was critical to the court of appeals’
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rejection of respondents’ right-of-association challenge.
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130,
1133-34 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting First Amendment
associational challenge because the statute permits
membership and affiliation with foreign terrorist
organizations, but prohibits the conduct of providing
material support or resources). But the permissibility
of membership and affiliation is now in doubt. Joining
or affiliating with a political organization is
quintessentially an act done “for the benefit of” the
group. Thus, the government’s construction would
appear to criminalize even pure membership and
affiliation. The government does not explain how one
is supposed to distinguish between ostensibly
permitted membership and advocacy, on the one hand,
and “service,” on the other. Citizens are forced to
guess, at their peril. Accordingly, the court of appeals
correctly deemed this provision unconstitutional as
applied as well.
B. The Provisions At Issue Directly
Implicate Speech and Associational Rights,
Triggering
Heightened
Vagueness
Standards
The government’s principal response to the court
of appeals’ unsurprising and unanimous conclusion
that these provisions are vague as applied to
respondents’ speech is to cite inapposite examples of
terms deemed not vague where First Amendment
interests and/or criminal penalties were not at stake.
Pet. 13-18. But vagueness standards are at their most
demanding when a criminal prohibition affects speech.
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844,
871-72 (1997); Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
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Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982). All of
the government’s examples arise from contexts
tolerating more lenient vagueness standards – such as
determining an appropriate attorney’s fee (Pet. 15),10
admitting expert evidence in court (Pet. 16),11
prohibiting the overseas transfer of money (Pet. 17)12
or heavy equipment (Pet. 18),13 or noncriminal
regulation of public employees’ speech (Pet. 14).14
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572 (1988). Pierce did not
address any vagueness issue, or purport to define (or explore the
precision of) the difference between “some distinctive knowledge or
specialized [litigation] skill” and “general lawyerly knowledge” –
both of which, from a lay person’s perspective, might or might not
be “specialized knowledge” in the present context.
11 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999).
Kumho did not address any vagueness issue, or purport to explore
the precision of “specialized knowledge” in Fed. R. Evid. 702.
12 United States v. Homa Int’l Trading Corp., 387 F.3d 144, 146 (2d
Cir. 2004) (transferring money for a fee was undeniably a service).
10

United States v. Hescorp, Heavy Equip. Sales Corp., 801 F.2d 70,
73-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1018 (1986). Hescorp
undertook a lengthy analysis of an Executive Order’s various
provisions and its history before concluding that, in context, the
“service” exception in the order could not reasonably be
understood to apply to limit the separately stated flat prohibition
on transferring physical goods to Iran. Even in the absence of a
speech issue, the court’s rejection of an ordinary vagueness
challenge required extensive reliance on interpretive guides that
are simply missing in the present context.
14 The government’s one cited authority involving speech is the
Ninth Circuit’s own decision in California Teachers Ass’n v. State
Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2001). There, the court
rejected a facial vagueness challenge to a law that required public
school teachers to use English predominantly in their instruction.
In that context, involving the interests of public employees in
public schools and no apparent criminal penalties, the court
explained that the rest of the law made clear that “instruction”
was tied to the “curriculum,” and on that basis concluded that
there was no substantial number of instances where there would
13
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The government maintains that, as applied in
this case, “the material-support statute does not
regulate speech,” and therefore does not warrant
heightened vagueness scrutiny. Pet. 13. That is
simply false, both as applied and more generally. All of
the activities the court of appeals listed as at stake
here are pure speech. See Pet. App. 5a n.1 (quoted at
page 10, supra). More generally, when the statute
prohibits “training,” defined as “instruction or
teaching,” it directly criminalizes speech. When the
statute prohibits conveying “expert advice,” it again
directly criminalizes speech. And when the statute
prohibits “service” as applied to respondents’ intended
activities, it also criminalizes speech – including,
according to the government, any advocacy done “for
the benefit of” a designated group. As applied here,
these provisions would criminalize the teaching of
humanitarian and international law, as well as
political advocacy. The essential premise of the
Government’s challenge in its petition is therefore
wrong.
For the same reason, the government is
mistaken in contending that the material-support
statute is sustainable as a content-neutral regulation
of conduct under United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968). Pet. 19-20. The O’Brien intermediate
scrutiny standard is reserved for content-neutral
regulations of conduct that only incidentally affect
speech or association, i.e., where the conduct might
have an expressive aspect. O’Brien does not apply to
be doubt about when English had to be used – in the classroom to
present the curriculum, not in private conversations with students
and parents, etc.
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direct criminalization of actual speech or association, or
to content-based discrimination. See, e.g., Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 402-03 (1989) (O’Brien
inapplicable to content-based flag desecration law). As
shown above, the statute here criminalizes speech qua
speech. And, far from being a mere regulation of time,
place, or manner, it flatly bans certain speech to or for
certain persons. Moreover, the provisions barring
“training” and “expert advice or assistance” expressly
discriminate on the basis of its content, favoring speech
on subjects of “general knowledge” and disfavoring
speech about “specific skill[s]” or derived from
“specialized knowledge.” Thus, O’Brien does not apply.
O’Brien also does not apply where a law directly
regulates expressive association. In Boy Scouts v. Dale,
530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000), the Court held O’Brien
inapplicable where a state’s general ban on
discrimination in public accommodations was applied
to the Boy Scouts in a way that directly infringed the
group’s rights of “expressive association” (by restricting
its ability to choose who would serve as a scoutmaster).
As the Court explained:
Dale contends that we should apply the
intermediate standard of review enunciated in
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), to
evaluate the competing interests. There the
Court enunciated a four-part test for review of a
governmental regulation that has only an
incidental effect on protected speech-in that case
the symbolic burning of a draft card. A law
prohibiting the destruction of draft cards only
incidentally affects the free speech rights of those
who happen to use a violation of that law as a

26
symbol of protest. But New Jersey's public
accommodations law directly and immediately
affects associational rights, in this case
associational rights that enjoy First Amendment
protection. Thus, O'Brien is inapplicable.
The same holds true in this case. As in Dale, the
application of the law directly infringes respondents’
associational rights, by precluding them from engaging
in any expressive activity whatsoever in conjunction
with the PKK or the LTTE.
Indeed,
the
challenged
provisions’
criminalization of speech and imposition of liability on
the basis of association with proscribed groups provide
independent grounds for affirming the court of appeals’
The “training” and “expert advice”
decision.15
provisions criminalize speech on the basis of its
content; and the “service” provision reaches speech and
association that Congress, trying to avoid First
Amendment harm, showed no interest in proscribing.
Because these provisions do not meet the tailoring and
interest requirements of any applicable First
Amendment test, they independently violate the First
Amendment.16
15 Respondents

argued below that the material-support statute as
a whole, as well as the specific provisions at issue here, were
invalid because they imposed guilt by association, in violation of
the First Amendment right of association and the Fifth
Amendment principle of individual culpability, and that the
provisions at issue were vague on their face The court of appeals
rejected those contentions, but respondents have preserved the
arguments, and they are independent bases for affirming the
injunction at issue here.
16
The provisions also are substantially overbroad. Rather than
restricting their scope to support that furthers terrorist activity,
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In addition, all three challenged provisions
penalize association, because their penalties are
triggered by the identity of the organization with which
respondents collaborate. Training the Irish Republican
Army in human rights advocacy, for example, is
permitted; but the very same training provided to the
PKK is a crime. Lobbying in conjunction with the
Palestine Liberation Organization is permissible; but
doing so in conjunction with the PKK is not. A law
barring the provision of services to the Kiwanis Club,
but prohibiting the same services if provided to the
Rotary Club, would readily be seen as a penalty on
association. That the targeted groups here are labeled
“terrorist” does not alter the fact that the trigger for
the criminal penalty is not the nature of the underlying
training, advice, or service, but the nature of the
association. As such, like the public accommodations
law in Dale, the provisions at issue here directly
penalize association, and can withstand constitutional
challenge only if they are narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling interest – which they are not.17
they sweep within their ambit a substantial amount of political
speech, advocacy, and association having no nexus whatsoever to
terrorism. See Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987); Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
The government contends that the court “confused the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines.” Pet. 18-19. But this
misreads the court of appeals’ opinion. The court merely noted, in
finding the terms vague, that they could conceivably encompass a
broad range of constitutionally protected speech. Pet. App. 22a,
24a, 25a. This was perfectly appropriate, because whether a
statute potentially criminalizes speech is “the most important
factor” affecting vagueness analysis. Village of Hoffman Estates,
455 U.S. at 499.
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not.17
C. The Government’s Proposed Statutory
Construction Conflicts with the
Statute’s Plain Language, and Would
Not Cure the Provisions’ Infirmities
Finally, the government is wrong that the
challenged provisions could have been saved by
interpreting them not to apply to “independent
advocacy.” Pet. 21. While courts are obliged to
construe ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional
questions, they can do so “only when such a course is
‘fairly possible’ or when the statute provides a ‘fair
alternative’ construction.” Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S.
372, 378-79 n.11 (1977). Here, the government’s
proposed construction is not “fairly possible,” and in
any event would not cure the constitutional defect.
It is not “fairly possible” because Congress
specifically addressed the scope of an exception for
“independent advocacy,” and chose to make “entirely
independent” advocacy a safe harbor only from the
specific prohibition on “personnel,” and not from any of
the statute’s other prohibitions. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h).
To read the statute as containing a general
This Court has repeatedly held that association-based penalties
must be restricted to association that is intended to further the
unlawful ends of the group. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982); United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258, 262 (1967); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 606 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966) (“a
law which applies to membership without the ‘specific intent’ to
further the illegal aims of the organization infringes unnecessarily
on protected freedoms”); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299300 (1961).
17
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“independent advocacy” exception would disregard
Congress’s choice to limit that exception to one
particular provision.
If the government wishes to rewrite the statute,
it should approach Congress, not this Court. The court
of appeals’ narrow ruling invites such congressional
reconsideration. It is not too much to ask Congress to
engage in that process, given the importance of the
constitutional rights at stake – rights that, as the
government has argued and Congress has declared,
Congress sought to respect.
In any event, the government’s proposed
construction would not save the statute. For one thing,
the government’s notion of “independent advocacy”
would not seem to cover speaking to members of the
organization, as respondents proposed to do here. That
is enough to make the government’s proposal not a
“saving” construction. And even when the audience is
outside the organization, activities such as writing,
speaking, and teaching do not lose their First
Amendment protection when done in coordination with
others. Newspaper reporters, for example, do not
forfeit their First Amendment rights because they
write under the direction of their editors.
Finally, the government’s proposed construction
would not clarify the provisions’ vagueness. Citizens
would still have to guess at whether their activities
were entirely “independent,” or involved “some
collaboration or other relationship between the giver
and the recipient.” Pet. 22. Would checking facts with
a PKK official on a human rights complaint constitute
a “collaboration or other relationship” warranting
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criminal sanctions?
Virtually any effort to
communicate with a designated group regarding one’s
advocacy could be viewed as forfeiting independence
and entering a “collaboration or other relationship.”
The government’s proposed “construction” would only
further muddy the waters.
CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, the petition for a
writ of certiorari should be denied.
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